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Abstract: This study is a case study of the dairy sector in the West Bank. It is based on 
qualitative field research and an extensive literature review. By asking how dairy farmers and 
dairy factory owners in the Hebron governorate perceive opportunities for and constraints to 
the expansion of their holdings, it analyses them in light of occupation policies and their 
implications for economic autonomy in the occupied Palestinian territories. On an empirical 
level, it concludes that intensive dairy cattle farms are better suited to land and water 
constraints than other forms of agriculture. On a theoretical level, it finds that Israeli neglect 
of bilateral agreements and ‘casual constraints’ preclude Palestinian economic autonomy, 
indicating the latter’s interdependence with the achievement of national sovereignty. 
Key words: dairy farming, West Bank, economic development, economic autonomy, 
occupation, Hebron governorate, agriculture 
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1. Introduction 
In the early morning hours of 1 May 2012, two bulldozers destroyed the livelihoods of four 
Palestinian families when they demolished their dairy farm buildings, milking equipment and 
mobile home. The action which took place in Bani Naim (Hebron area) was supervised by 
Israeli military, police and intelligence representatives. The farmer, who owns 100 cows, now 
has to face difficult decisions about how to take care of the cattle without the necessary sheds 
and machinery.
1
 This incidence, an occasional occurrence in the West Bank, has more far-
reaching and serious connotations than one might initially think. It has a bearing on issues of 
property security, risk management and access to resources as well as implications for 
economic autonomy– factors that directly impact the everyday realities of farmers in this 
area.
2
 The ways how farmers deal with such challenges in turn affect local economic 
development. 
Considering Palestine‟s struggle for statehood, it has been suggested that a strong, more 
autonomous economy would, amongst other factors, support the process of state-building and 
achieving political sovereignty.
3
 However, any viable solution to the conflict must take into 
account the (relative) economic standing of the Palestinian territories and the legacy and 
impact of occupation.
4
 Currently, the West Bank still relies on the import of various products 
from the State of Israel and other countries.
5
 For Palestinians in the West Bank, becoming less 
dependent on those imports and on international aid programs would significantly reduce 
vulnerability caused by the impacts of global food prices on the domestic market and (inter-) 
                                                          
1
 Christian Peacemaker Team, “Palestine: Dairy Farm Demolished,” Signs of the Times 22, no. 2, 30 June 2012, 
accessed May 24, 2015, http://www.cpt.org/news/sott/articles/2012/palestine-dairy-farm-demolished. 
2
 Economic autonomy and economic sovereignty are used interchangeably in this thesis. They refer to the 
freedom to determine economic policies without external constraints being binding. 
3
 Marwan Naser, “Ahead for Developing Visions and Strategies of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” 
BRISMES Annual conference (2012): 1, 22; Vincent El Hayek, “Palestinian Economic Development: Israeli 
Actions in Light of the 1994 Paris Protocol and International Economic Law,” Minnesota Journal of International 
Law 24, no.2, (2015): 223; A. Arnon and J. Weinblatt, “Sovereignty and economic development: The case of 
Israel and Palestine,” The Economic Journal 111, (2001): 301, 304. 
4
 Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, “The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine,” 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). Occupation: This term refers to the (occupied) Palestinian 
territories, consisting of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Since the Six-Day War of 1967, these areas are 
under military occupation by the State of Israel. 
5
 Adam Hanieh, “Class and State in the West Bank: Neoliberalism under occupation,” In Lineages of Revolt: 
Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2013), 110; F. M. Naqib, 
“Economic Aspects of the Palestinian–Israeli Conﬂict: The collapse of the Oslo Accord,” Journal of International 
Development 15 (2003): 506. 
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national political or diplomatic quarrels affecting flows of goods and money to Palestine.
6
 In 
this thesis, I investigate the opportunities for and constraints to the expansion of domestic 
food production in the West Bank, part of the Palestinian Territories, by focusing on the case 
of the dairy industry, that is, milk-producing farms and dairy factories in the Hebron 
governorate.  
The research focus in this thesis is twofold, consisting of an interconnected empirical and 
theoretical analysis. Empirically, I investigate sector-specific socio-economic, political and 
institutional parameters that act as constraints or opportunities to the dairy industry‟s 
possibilities for horizontal and vertical expansion.
7
 The realization of expansion is influenced 
by a range of factors. Access to natural resources such as water and land belong to the most 
important elements.
8
 Next to a constant, reliable availability of such natural inputs, price 
levels may play an important role too.
9
 Furthermore, uncertainties with regard to labour and 
property security (property rights),
10
 management of risks,
11
 the segmentation of the West 
Bank into different administrative areas of (military) control,
 12
 infrastructure, and arbitrary 
implementation of political agreements are significant factors that need to be taken into 
account when exploring opportunities and constraints faced by farmers and factory owners.
13
 
By analysing these factors in the light of their significance to economic development, I aim to 
investigate the role of state-level economic autonomy under occupation. Together with a 
unique methodological approach, this represents the most important theoretical contribution 
of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
6
Ken Albala, Food cultures of the world encyclopaedia. Africa and the Middle East, Volume 1 (2011), 285; 
Hanieh, 110. 
7
 Dr. Fawzi Asadi, “How Viable Will the Agricultural Economy Be in the New State of Palestine?” Geo Journal 21, 
no. 4 (1990): 375; Sharif S. Elmusa and Mahmud El-Jaafari, “Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian Economic 
Protocol,” Journal of Palestine Studies 24, no. 2 (1995): 26-27. Horizontal expansion refers to increases in 
farm/plant size and vertical expansion refers to increase of output through intensification. 
8
 Maher O. Abu-Madi, “Farm-level perspectives regarding irrigation water prices in the Tulkarm district, 
Palestine,” Agricultural Water Management 96 (2009): 1345; World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza: The Economic 
Effects of Restricted Access to Land in the West Bank,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2008): 16. 
9
 Abu-Madi, 1345; Ian Coxhead, Gerald Shively and Xiaobing Shuai, “Development policies, resource 
constraints, and agricultural expansion on the Philippine land frontier,” Environment and Development 
Economics 7 (2002): 342-346. 
10
 World Bank (2008): 31. 
11
 World Bank, “World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development,” 
(2014): 53. 
12
 World Bank (2008): 13. 
13
 Stanley Fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, Ulric Erickson von Allmen, “Economic developments in the West Bank 
and Gaza since Oslo,” The Economic Journal 111 (2001): 271. 
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Research question 
In accordance with the objectives of the study outlined above, I have formulated a twofold 
research question, consisting of an empirical and a theoretical part. Below, I define and 
explain its main components. 
How do dairy farmers and dairy factory owners in the Hebron governorate perceive 
opportunities for and constraints to the expansion of their holdings and which 
implications do constraints have for economic autonomy in the occupied Palestinian 
territories? 
Next to investigating this question on a conceptual level by means of a literature review, I 
have conducted a number of qualitative interviews with dairy farmers and dairy factory 
owners in the Hebron Governorate in the West Bank.
14
 This case study constitutes the main 
part of my thesis. It aims to ethnographically investigate the lived micro-economic realities of 
livestock farmers and dairy producers with a focus on their perceptions of the constraints and 
opportunities they face with regard to the expansion of their farms and factories.
15
 Dairy 
products are particularly relevant because they are a staple in the West Bank; especially 
yoghurt and related products are consumed with most meals. Demand for these goods is high, 
whereas domestic production of such staples is insufficient and supply highly depends on 
imports. Regarding the empirical level of my thesis, my interest thus lies in exploring the 
subjective possibilities for West Bank farmers to increase output by means of e.g. expanding 
their livestock count, applying modern farm technologies and increases in farm size. By way 
of addressing the second part of the research question, the case study analysis further serves 
as the empirical basis for more theoretical investigations looking at the role of economic 
sovereignty on the state-level.  
The results of the case study are not meant to generalize from with regard to other businesses 
in the region or even the dairy sector in the whole West Bank. Rather, my research approach 
here may be seen as an idiographic one, representing an ethnographic study that aims to 
“understand the meaning of contingent, unique, and often subjective phenomena, [...] 
                                                          
14
 Opportunities refer to possibilities of dairy farmers and producers to expand or intensify their businesses as 
determined by socio-economic and political factors. This excludes biological factors such as the milk production 
per cow but includes, i.a., tangible and intangible assets (see 2.1). Constraints refer to the same factors as 
above in so far as they work against growth (expansion or intensification) of the livestock farms or dairy 
production facilities. 
15
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences (MIT 
Press, 2004). 
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emphasizing the unique elements of the individual phenomenon.”16 Further significant 
advantages of case studies are their ability to accommodate complex causal relations and to 
“heuristically identify new variables and hypotheses […] in the course of field work.”17 An 
approach based on these elements is well suited for the investigation of my research questions 
due to the unique location, complex political-economic conditions and contrasting views held 
of the occupied Palestinian territories and because of the interdisciplinary approach of this 
thesis.  
Contributions to the field 
A review of relevant literature showed that there are very few academic works on 
opportunities for or limitations to economic development in the West Bank. Knowledge about 
those is crucial in order to advance scholarly understanding of economic development and 
economic autonomy under occupation. The latter two factors have largely been neglected in 
scholarly debates about the political-economic situation in the oPt. Several articles have 
analysed the economic situation after the Oslo Accords and the Paris Protocol, but these 
studies mainly looked at the potential for economic development in the West Bank from a 
macro-perspective, neglecting the micro-economic reality for individual actors in the private 
sectors.
18
 There is thus a need to investigate economic possibilities for actors in the various 
sectors under the given circumstances. For such an analysis to be fruitful, it has to take into 
account the asymmetrical relationship between the Israeli and Palestinian economies. The 
asymmetry mainly is constituted through the territories‟ crippling import, finance and labour 
dependency on Israel and the latter‟s dominance in trade matters and arbitrary implementation 
of economic agreements between the two parties.
19
 This asymmetry is likely to have 
significant repercussions for the oPt‟s economic sovereignty. Consequently, insights derived 
from a thorough study of this factor are vital to inform policies (both Palestinian domestic and 
foreign (donor) policy towards the region), formulate action plans and act upon them in order 
to heighten economic stability and independency.
20
  
The approach I employ in this thesis is interdisciplinary: the theoretical framework combines 
concepts of Political Economy with aspects of Development Studies. By investigating 
                                                          
16
 Marianne A. Larsen, “Beyond binaries: a way forward for comparative education,” Revista Española de 
Educación Comparada 6, (2012): 146. 
17
 George and Bennett, 20-22. 
18
 El Hayek; Arnon and Weinblatt; Adel Samara, “Globalization, the Palestinian Economy, and the ‘Peace 
Process,’” Social Justice: a Journal of Crime, Conflict and World Order 27, no. 4 (2000). 
19
 Gianni Vaggi and Sara Baroud, “Asymmetries and Economic Interaction between Israel and Palestine,” 
(2005): 3. 
20
 Abdelnour (2010). 
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opportunities for development in the dairy sector from a political economy perspective 
combined with qualitative research among farmers in the West Bank, I provide a new 
perspective and insights that differ from the current theoretical paradigm. The prevailing 
humanitarian viewpoint focusing on violations of human rights in the oPt is valuable, but 
insufficient for comprehending the underlying forces at play and for generating knowledge 
about these forces‟ impacts on economic stability and sustainability.21 Political economy and 
sub-sector analysis is essential to understanding Israel‟s on-going colonization and 
dispossession of Palestinians.
22
 Additionally, the methodology used in this thesis is unique 
because its main component is a case study based on ethnographic field research investigating 
political-economic issues, an unusual combination that can provide fresh academic insights.  
Demographic information about the case study area  
The field research for the case study took place in the city of Hebron and the adjoining 
villages Sa‟ir, Idna, Al Aroub and Bani Naem. They are situated in Hebron governorate, the 
most southern province of the West Bank, which is part of the Palestinian Territories. I have 
decided on this location for several reasons. This area has the highest concentration of dairy 
businesses (farms and production plants) in the West Bank. Furthermore the city of Hebron is, 
concerning the Israeli occupation, a particularly heavily affected Palestinian community due 
to the presence of an Israeli settlement in the old city centre. This means that Palestinians 
settlements and Israeli settlers are living in close proximity to each other. Further, there are 23 
Israeli settlements with 15000 inhabitants in the governorate. Its built-up area and system of 
bypass roads built for the exclusive use of settlers cover 7.4 percent of the total district; land 
that is off-limits to Palestinians.
23
 Also, the governorate contains many religious and historical 
sites that are very important to both Muslim and Jewish believers. These factors all contribute 
to making Hebron a very tense district with regular street riots between Palestinians, settlers 
and Israeli soldiers. The district is therefore well suited to study connections between the 
conduct of (dairy) business, farmers and the occupation.
24
 
There are 684,247 inhabitants in Hebron governorate.
25
 The population of each of the villages 
where I carried out field research varied between 18000 and 22000.
26
 The West Bank is 
                                                          
21
 Hanieh, 99- 100. 
22
 Ibid, 100. 
23
 Land Research Centre, “Geopolitical situations In Hebron Governorate Palestine,” Arab Studies Society 
(2006); Hanieh, 103. 
24
 Land Research Centre. 
25
 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, “West Bank Southern Governorates Statistical Yearbook, 2013,” 
(2014): 49. 
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subdivided in three zones, area A is under control of the Palestinian Authority, area B under 
shared control and area C is under the sole control of the Israeli government. The West Bank 
is landlocked and has borders with Israel and Jordan. About 43.3 percent of its area is used for 
agricultural purposes. The West Bank‟s ethnic groups consist of 83 percent Palestinian Arabs 
and others and about 17 percent Jews. The predominant language is Arabic, but Hebrew is 
spoken by many as well. With regard to religion, the majority is Sunni Muslim. 
 
Map 1.
27
 Map of Hebron governorate. The interview locations are marked red. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26
 PCBS, “Hebron Governorate Statistical Yearbook,” (2011): 65. 
27
 “West Bank Map,” Mappery, accessed online January 18, 2016, http://www.mappery.com/map-of/West-
Bank-Map. 
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Structure 
In the first part of chapter two, I explain the theoretical framework that underpins this paper, 
while the second part outlines the methodology used for the field work on which the case 
study is based. Chapter three looks at the most important issues constituting obstacles to 
growth for all stakeholders in the West Bank‟s dairy business: access to land in relation to 
occupation policies, the problematic nature of imported inputs and availability of water. The 
chapter further deals with the implications of these obstacles for economic autonomy. While 
chapter three considers the empirical results on a more theoretical level, chapter four looks at 
them with respect to policy implications, serving to describe and analyse the empirical 
findings with regard to marketing, farming practice and risk management as experienced by 
sheep and cattle farmers. Here, the focus lies on the limitations and opportunities encountered 
by dairy farmers and producers with regard to business expansion and intensification on a 
micro-level. The fifth chapter is a comprehensive conclusion summarizing my findings in 
regard to the research question and their political-economic relevance. Additionally, it points 
out limitations of this study and provides a few policy recommendations. 
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2. Theoretical Concepts and Methodology 
In this chapter, I lay out the theoretical framework underpinning this paper and explain the 
research design for the case study. 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
The paper is founded on the premise that economic sovereignty is, if not a requirement, then a 
critical feature of a state‟s political sovereignty.28 Despite its distinctive significance for this 
region, the occupied Palestinian territories have achieved neither political nor economic 
sovereignty.
29
 Although the Oslo Accords resulted in the establishment of a functioning 
economic administration, the agreements never managed to achieve what they promised to.
30
 
These Accords (Oslo I and II) are a set of agreements between Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization signed in 1993 and 1995, marking the beginning of the „peace 
process.‟31 The agreement created the Palestinian Authority, providing it with limited self-
rule.
32
 In order to build a viable, strong Palestinian economy, efforts need to be directed 
towards the promotion and successful realization of economic development.
33 
The years between the Oslo agreements and the year 2000, however, were marked by low 
economic growth. This was mainly caused by difficulties of movement within and between 
the oPt and Israel, frequent closures and excessive transportation and transaction costs.
34
  
In the academic literature, the potential for economic development in the West Bank has been 
analysed primarily from a macro-perspective, as demonstrated by various studies dealing with 
the Palestinian economic situation, trade possibilities and the economic relationship and 
interconnections between Israel and Palestine before and after the Oslo Accords.
35
 Other 
scholars have delineated a legal trade framework for a future scenario in which Palestine 
                                                          
28
 Arnon and Weinblatt, 304, 306; Abdelnour (2010): 2-3; Arie Arnon, Avia Spivak, Oren Sussman, “Incomplete 
Contracts, the Port of Gaza and the Case for Economic Sovereignty,” (2000): 1-3. 
29
 Arnon et al. 
30
 Fischer et al., 274. 
31
 See “Declaration of Principles, 13 Sep 1993’’ and “The Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, 28 Sep 1995.” 
32
 Naqib, 500.  
33
 Asadi, 375; Raja J. Khalidi and Sahar Taghdisi-Rad, “The economic dimensions of prolonged occupation: 
continuity and change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinian economy,” United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development – UNCTAD (2009): 27. 
34
 Fischer et al., 264-265. 
35
 Naqib; Fischer et al.; Yusif A. Sayigh, “The Palestinian Economy under Occupation: Dependency and 
Pauperization,” Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 15, No. 4 (1986); El Hayek; World Bank, “West Bank and Gaza: 
Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy,” (2013): 7-10. 
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could become a sovereign state with sovereign control over all its assets and resources.
36
 A 
review of recent literature shows that the majority has been published around the year 2000 
and that very few publications investigate the effects of the Oslo agreements on the political 
economy of Palestine in the longer term, i.e. ten to twenty years later. Although older work 
(from before 2000) has certainly not become irrelevant, it does not take into account such 
long-term effects and economic developments.
37
 In particular, these older studies have not 
considered how the Paris Protocol has impacted economic relations, possibilities and 
constraints, i.e., realities for the various economic sectors in the West Bank.  
Part of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Protocol on Economic Relations was incorporated 
into the Oslo II Accord and signed in 1994.
38
 Its aim was to increase Palestinian economic 
prosperity.
39
 The Protocol was meant to establish something similar to a customs union and to 
develop a framework for the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories. In practice, however, stalling economic progress in the years that followed it 
meant that hopes were dashed quickly.
40
 Many parts of the Protocol that seemed initially 
promising, like the free movement of goods, could never develop fully because of Israel‟s 
violations of the agreements by introducing a system of permits and border closures combined 
with extensive security checks and delays at border crossings.
41
 Hanafi argues that the 
protocol ignored the unequal status of the two sides; one controlling the borders and sea- and 
airports, the other a recently appointed national authority with little experience in trade 
matters. In effect, the protocol institutionalized the asymmetries between the Israeli and 
Palestinian economies.
42
  
While El Hayek has analysed the current economic situation with regard to the stipulations 
and violations of the protocol, he did not look at its effects on actors in the private sector on a 
micro-economic level. Although partially investigating the impact of economic and other 
agreements on the overall economy of the West Bank, an overview of recent and older 
research reveals an absence of topical analyses of the micro-economic reality of Palestinians 
                                                          
36
 Paul Rivlin, “Trade Potential in the Middle East: Some Optimistic Findings,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 4, no. 1 (2000). 
37
 Arnon and Weinblatt. 
38
 David Cobham, “Economic aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Introduction,” The Economic Journal 110 
(2001):250-251. 
39
 Arnon and Weinblatt, 291. 
40
 El Hayek, 223, 228. 
41
 El Hayek, 230-232. 
42
 Sari Hanafi, “Explaining spacio-cide in the Palestinian territory: Colonization, separation, and state of 
exception,” Current Sociology 61, no.2 (2012): 196. 
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working in the various (sub-) sectors.
43
 Conscious of this gap in academic work, the present 
study tries to draw attention to how economic development proceeds „on the ground‟ and to 
how lived realities are influenced by (absent) economic sovereignty. This perspective is 
crucial to gain understanding of a new development approach that is tailored to the specific 
situation faced by Palestinian economic actors. 
Much research about the oPt has been done from a humanitarian, i.e. rights-based 
perspective.
44
 This focus clearly was, or still is, aligned with the aid regime that has evolved 
during the second half of the last century in the oPt and has come to dominate the Palestinian 
development agenda.
45
 I argue that a fresh perspective is required. Any (new) approach to 
economic development, academic as well as policy-oriented, has to take into account two 
important issues. First, such an approach has to accommodate, i.e. adapt to the reality of the 
inherently asymmetrical political economic relationship between the economies of the oPt and 
Israel and the economic dependency of the Territories on Israel due to the latter‟s power to 
impose sanctions or withhold tax revenue.
46
 Theories that fail to discuss these asymmetries 
may lead to misinterpretation of the economic and social realities on the ground and short-
lived alleviation of symptomatic problems. Both on a theoretical and policy level, instead the 
focus needs to be on a long-term, sustainable strategy for the Palestinian economy. 
Accommodating the current situation certainly does not imply accepting it, but it explicitly 
rejects defeatist beliefs that the oPt would be unable to reach any economic and 
developmental successes as long as the occupation continues. In my view, such beliefs only 
lead to passivity and numbness that make it even more difficult to improve the political and 
economic standing of Palestinians. 
The second issue in working out a new policy-approach is the need of finding a way to 
increase local agency and reduce aid dependency, which has contributed to indirectly sustain 
the status quo of Palestinian de-development and Israeli occupation policies.
47
 The necessity 
for a change in development perspective has also been recognized by donors and development 
agencies.
48
 The OECD, for example, proposes a shift in focus on regional specific assets and 
                                                          
43
 Fischer; Naqib; El Hayek; Elmusa and El-Jaafari; Cobham. 
44
 Hanieh, 99-101. 
45
 Abdelnour (2010): 2. 
46
 Vaggi and Baroud, 3; Fischer et al., 269; El Hayek, 235. 
47
 Azoulay and Ophir, 1, 3 and Sara Roy, “De-development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since 
Oslo,” Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (1999). 
48
 Abdelnour (2010): 1. 
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further emphasises opportunity rather than disadvantage or the need for support.
49
 With regard 
to the first issue, the Territories‟ systematic dependence comes most clearly to the fore in 
three areas: It is most significant in trade, because the oPt constitute a captive market for 
Israeli exports. Palestinian trade dependency becomes even more obvious considering that 
Israel accounts for 71 per cent of the oPt‟s imports, and receives 97 per cent of its exports.50 
Further, there is a labour dependency due to structurally distorted sectors in the Palestinian 
economy resulting in a loss of work opportunities.  
Finance is also affected due to the oPt‟s dependence on aid flows and substantial remittances 
from family members living abroad, which constitute the resources for working capital and 
investment.
51
 The Palestinian economy represents a captive market for Israeli products 
because the competition that should have evolved between producers on both sides in a 
„normal‟ integration process did not materialise.52 Moreover, the Israeli dominance over the 
oPt‟s economy is perpetuated because Israeli authorities control all sea- and airports. In 
addition, Israel has installed various non-tariff barriers, meaning that not only imports and 
exports, but also trade between Gaza and the West Bank involve high transportation and 
transaction costs.
53
 
Agriculture has traditionally been one of the most important sectors of the Palestinian 
economy, not only as an employment opportunity but also because it provides protection 
against income reductions and food insecurity during times of crisis.
54
 Despite its relevance, 
research on farmers in Palestine is rather rare. In most studies, agriculture in the Palestinian 
Territories is broadly analysed as part of a larger focus on their economy.
55
 Although the 
sector has large potential, current statistics show that its contribution to the Palestinian 
economy and its productivity have decreased in recent years, while the number of people 
employed in it has actually increased between 1995 and 2006.
56
 Spurring economic 
development by strengthening the agricultural sector is not only of economic significance, but 
would also facilitate a decreasing dependence on the Israeli economy as well as on food 
                                                          
49
 OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, “Regional Development,” (2015), 
accessed 25 May 2015, http://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-policy/regionaldevelopment.htm. 
50
 El Hayek, 230. 
51
 Sayigh, 47-50. 
52
 Arnon and Weinblatt, 293. 
53
 El Hayek, 243. 
54
 Samara, 119; TechnoServe Inc. and Oxfam, “A Roadmap for Agribusiness Development in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories: An analysis of the Vegetables & Herbs, Dairy, and Sheep & Goats subsectors,” UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), (2011): 8. 
55
 Raja Khalidi, The Arab Economy in Israel: The Dynamics of a Region's Development, (London, Sydney, and 
New York: Croom Helm, 1988). 
56
 World Bank (2013): 7-8. 
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imports and contribute to Palestinian food security.
57
 Especially certain agricultural goods 
with a high economic value per unit, like fruits, vegetables, meat, eggs, milk products, and 
fish are significant here. The demand for such high-value food commodities is mainly driven 
by rising incomes, urbanization and changing preferences, the growth of which can be 
observed in many developing countries today.
58
 
As agricultural sub-sector generating high-value products, dairy production in the West Bank 
is a branch with vast potential.
59
 Demand for dairy products in the West Bank is rising 
steadily, both due to rapid population growth and changing patterns in consumer 
preferences.
60
 At the same time, the West Bank still is highly dependent on Israeli milk 
products.
61
 Research is thus needed in order to assess the opportunities for growth and map 
the constraints and difficulties faced by actors in this sub-sector. Naturally, one of the most 
important groups here are dairy farmers. The most relevant factors influencing (dairy) 
farmers‟ decisions about resource allocation with regard to farm expansion and intensification 
are access to resources, property rights, risk management, and informal and policy 
institutions.
62
 Chamber and Conway group some of these factors in tangible (resources and 
stores) and intangible assets (claims and access). Stores include savings and food stocks while 
resources refer to land, water, livestock and farm equipment. Claims are demands or appeals 
made in times of need for material, moral or practical support.
63
 Access refers to the 
“opportunity in practice to use a resource, store or service or to obtain information, material, 
technology, employment, food or income.”64 The few studies that have been carried with this 
focus were conducted in other countries, for example in Ethiopia and Rwanda.
65
 They indicate 
the relevance and significance of dairy farming for (economic) development.
66
 In line with 
                                                          
57
 Asadi, 376; World Bank, “Sector Note April 2009: West Bank and Gaza - Assessment of Restrictions on 
Palestinian Water Sector Development,” (2009): 25; Samara, 128. 
58
 Ashok Gulati, Nicholas Minot, Chris Delgado, Saswati Bora, “Growth in high-value agriculture in Asia and the 
emergence of vertical links with farmers,” (paper presented at the workshop “Linking Small-Scale Producers to 
Markets: Old and New Challenges,” The World Bank, 15 December 2005), 1-2. 
59
 C. Devendra, “Smallholder dairy production systems in developing countries: Characteristics, potential and 
opportunities for improvement, Review,” Asian-Australasian Journal of Animal Sciences 14, no. 1 (2001): 104. 
60
 Jon Pedersen, Sara Randall and Marwan Khawaja, “Growing Fast: The Palestinian Population in the West 
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this framework, I have conducted a small field study of the dairy business in the Hebron 
governorate. This empirical research was crucial in order to gain the micro-level insights that 
are largely missing from the literature. Also, it revealed often overlooked subjective views 
held by individual economic actors in light of the occupation. The next section outlines the 
methodology used for the field research. 
2.2 Field research methodology 
This section outlines the way the fieldwork for this thesis was conducted. I explain the 
procedure, the selection of participants (sampling method), the research subject, the 
instrumentation, and the nature of the questions I asked the respondents. The interview 
guides, which differ per target group, can be found in Attachment 1. I have limited this case 
study to dairy farmers and other stakeholders related to the dairy industry in the Hebron 
governorate. This region is well-known for its dairy production in the West Bank. The 
governorate has one of the highest numbers of cattle, next to Nablus and Jenin governorates, 
the largest quantity of sheep and relatively high quantities of goats.
67
 More specifically, at the 
end of 2013, there were 4077 cows, 150380 sheep and 34706 goats for milk production in the 
Hebron governorate.
68
  
Procedure 
The field research has been carried out for the duration of four weeks and took place in the 
Hebron area. During every interview, I was accompanied by one of two (non-professional) 
translators, who are inhabitants of Hebron and English teachers at local secondary schools. 
They immediately translated the questions I posed towards the respondents in English into the 
local Arabic dialect. They then translated the respondent‟s answer back to me. The interviews 
mainly took place in the living rooms of respondents, in a fairly quiet atmosphere. A few 
interviews took place in managers‟ or engineers‟ offices, others on the farm terrain. The 
interviews took between one and two hours. Often, the interviewees were the heads of the 
respective households, i.e. the father and husband.
69
 All of the farmers had large households 
with about ten members. The majority of respondents were between 40 and 60 years old. 
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Selection of participants 
The target population consisted of dairy farmers in the Hebron governorate. There were 2118 
animal and 4669 mixed holdings in this governorate in 2013.
70
 In 2010, there were 309 
holdings who kept cattle, 4463 holdings who kept sheep and 2213 holdings who kept goats 
for milk production.
71
 
The sampling procedure consisted of convenience sampling.
72
 Respondents were mainly 
selected through the snowball sampling method or chain-referral, a method that is commonly 
used in anthropology and social science research in order to locate, access and involve people 
in cases where the researcher expects difficulties in creating a representative sample of the 
research population.
73
 Biernacki and Waldorf describe it as yielding a “sample through 
referrals made among people who share or know of others who possess some characteristics 
that are of research interest.” 74 I applied snowball sampling according to this definition, 
because for the interviews, selection of the respondents depended heavily on connections of 
the two translators with relatives, friends and acquaintances owning livestock and references 
of a municipality employee. Stakeholders other than farmers were contacted by telephone in 
order to fix an appointment with them. Snowball sampling is uniquely suited for research 
conducted in a conflict environment and marginalized societies.
75
 The oPt can be considered 
such a setting due to its contested political status, human rights violations and military 
oppression.
76
 In such an environment of uncertainty and risk, the knowledge that the 
researcher was referred by a trusted person increases the potential of successful cooperation 
and data collection.
77
 Additionally, snowball sampling provides unique dynamic social 
knowledge.
78
 Because of this method‟s uncomplicated and flexible selection procedure, it was 
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well suited to accommodate monetary and time constraints on the one hand while enabling me 
to acquire valuable information and insights on the other.
79
 
The research participants mainly were dairy farmers who have sheep and goats or cows for 
milk production and dairy factory managers. Additionally, I have interviewed a representative 
at the local office of the PA Ministry of Agriculture in Hebron, an engineer at the water 
department of the municipality of Hebron and an agricultural engineer working for the farm 
that is part of the technical college in Al Aroub. All participants were located in the city of 
Hebron or surrounding villages, all of which are situated in Hebron governorate. The farms I 
visited are located in Hebron city, Yatta, Bani Naem, Al Aroub, Idna and Sa‟ir. With regard to 
farmers, the participants had to satisfy the following conditions in order to be interviewed: 
Own at least 15 sheep, goats or cows, hold them primarily for milk production, and sell the 
milk or products from it. In addition, they needed to be situated in Hebron governorate. The 
selection criteria for dairy factories were that they process milk professionally, i.e. by 
machines, and sell them to supermarkets in the West Bank. Finally, they needed to be located 
in Hebron. In order to obtain certain information first-hand, I additionally arranged interviews 
with two offices that are part of the Hebron municipality and the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
distribution of interviewees is shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1. Number of interviewees according to farm size and profession. 
One of the cow farms belonged to a technical college. This farm is, as I have been told, used 
for study purposes but as well for profit. It is however somewhat different than the other 
farms, since it is funded by the Ministry of Education and the college cooperates with giz, a 
German NGO. In total, I have carried out 23 interviews. 
Data collection 
The interviews focused on the daily work experience of farmers and managers, including any 
difficulties they face and their perceptions and opinions about the farming sector. My 
interview with the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture focused on governmental 
support for farmers and their approach to dealing with livestock in the oPt. With regard to my 
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interview with the municipality water department, the focus was on access to water for 
inhabitants of the town, prices, water networks and supply. 
Semi-structured interviews were used to collect the data.
80
 Before I started interviewing, I 
developed interview guides for each target group.
81
 It was necessary to design four different 
guides; for farmers, factory managers, the water department engineer and the ministry 
representative. The guides all consist of 20 to 30 open-ended questions based on the primary 
research questions. The questions to farmers covered, next to some personal information, the 
following topics: number of animals, milk and dairy production, willingness or ability to get a 
bank loan, inputs used in daily farm work, problems with obtaining these inputs, price 
satisfaction, ability and willingness to expand their farm by buying or renting additional land, 
animals or machinery, work experience and opinions about the farming sector. The questions 
for factory managers differed somewhat. I included various questions on their marketing 
strategies, product diversification, supply and demand of their products and inputs and access 
difficulties. In the following two chapters, I analyse the empirical findings of the fieldwork 
with regard to my research question and position them in context with relevant literature. 
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3. Resource constraints and economic autonomy 
In this chapter I focus on common obstacles encountered by sheep, goat and dairy cattle 
farmers and dairy factories by analysing findings from the field study and placing them in 
context with relevant literature. These obstacles faced by farmers are particular to the 
occupation and are direct or indirect consequences of it. They concern land, property security, 
imported inputs and water. These resource constraints make daily life for participants of the 
dairy sub-sector not just more difficult, but also function as obstacles to its expansion and 
development. 
3.1 Access to land and occupation policies 
Land scarcity, loans and livestock systems 
The interviews showed that the amount of land farmers possess differs significantly. Families 
own between one and twenty donums (1 donum=1000m2).
82
 Others had between 50 and 200 
donums, but such amounts were distributed among several members of the extended family.
83
 
Some families also rent land in order to grow foods for home consumption.
 84
 According to 
official statistics, in 2010, 99 per cent of animal holdings were under 3 donums in size, with 
an average of 0.3 donums per holding, while mixed holdings had an average size of 24.1 
donums.
85
 This shows that generally, livestock keeping requires much less land than 
horticulture or arable farming and is thus more suitable with regard to the scarcity of land 
faced by Palestinians. Buying additional land is mostly a question of money, but few families 
have enough capital to acquire more donums. Often, the income from selling dairy is just 
enough to cover the household‟s expenses.86 Nearly all farmers agree that land in the city 
outskirts is very expensive and that there is little available for buying. Plots in the countryside 
are cheaper, but livestock farmers, especially those who keep sheep as a hobby, prefer to have 
their animals near the house because it is safer and easier to look after them that way.
87
  
The location of land plays a significant role. Most importantly, land including any buildings 
or livestock on it may not be safe because it runs the risk of being confiscated or destroyed by 
the Israeli Defence Force. This is a risk usually associated with plots in area C. Land near 
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settlements is not desirable at all because working on it is nearly impossible.
88
 I deal with 
these issues in the next sections.  
There are a few additional reasons why certain plots may not be suitable for livestock 
farming.
89
 Neighbours can be a problem because they may get annoyed of having the sheep 
live between the houses.
90
 Also sheep cannot be kept on plots with buildings or trees on it; 
because they will eat the rind.
91
 Because of population pressure, many plots of lands 
especially in area A are used for building, additionally causing prices of the remaining plots to 
rise.
92
 According to one farmer, lands suitable for keeping livestock are the most limited.
93
 
Various farmers reported that prices for land were much lower in the past.
94
 Due to the 
scarcity of agricultural land, farmers who previously took out their sheep and goats for 
grazing now keep them in sheds and have to buy feed for them.
95
  
Related to such adaptations in farming practice is a study by Coxhead et al. about farming in 
the Philippines, which found that changes in relative prices can alter land use patterns.
96
 This 
indicates the prospect for farmers to adapt their livelihood to the scarcity, and hence high 
prices, of land. Mixed farmers may learn that intensive livestock systems can be established 
on much less land than arable farms and therefore are more suited to the present land use 
restrictions in the oPt. In turn, given they have the necessary starting capital; farmers may be 
induced to allocate their land to livestock sheds instead of crops.  
Examining the possibilities for horizontal expansion while facing high land prices, it turned 
out that apart from very few exceptions, most sheep and cow farmers did not want to try to get 
a loan from a bank, because they consider it haram (illegal) in Islam.
97
 One interviewee 
however claimed that about 30 per cent of farmers would take loans from Islamic banks and 
organizations.
98
 Although there are Islamic banks in Hebron, many people doubt their 
practices and find the (religious) conditions for being allowed to take a loan too vague to 
apply them in practice. Thus, if a family wants to make an expensive purchase like a plot of 
land or farm equipment, they need to have the necessary amount saved or lent from other 
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family members. It is possible that the hesitation to take loans is specific for the Hebron area, 
which is known for its piousness. Perceptions about loans may differ in other, less devout 
regions of the West Bank. Also it is possible that interviewees gave the socially-desired 
answer because of the presence of a translator who is a Hebron resident and Muslim. Few 
farmers said they would not even be able to get a loan, if they wanted to, because their income 
is too unreliable and they are no employees.
99
 
None of the sheep farmers seemed to have concrete plans to buy or rent more land, but two 
cow farmers expressed the aspiration to do so if they found suitable plots with sufficient 
supply of water, electricity and the possibility to get a (building) licence.
100
 Success in 
livestock farming does not seem to depend on owning a large land area. Small plots of land 
(up to three donums) can also be used to build stables even for a larger number of cows, as 
done by some farmers in Yatta and Idna who operated intermediate size intensive systems 
with about 50 heads of cattle. These farmers had just one or two donums, but, in contrast to 
the sheep farmers, made full use of it.
101
 Intensive farming systems however require more (or 
different) knowledge with regard to hygiene, animal welfare and the prevention of health 
hazards.
102
 
Occupation policies and difficulties of farming in area C 
Since the Oslo Accords, land in the West Bank is split into three administrative divisions. In 
area A, land disposition is fully controlled by Palestinians authorities. Area B is under shared 
control with the PA, but Israelis still full control land registration procedures. In area C, Israel 
has full authority over zoning, building and land registration.
103
 Such segmentation in the 
form of land use restrictions minimizes sectoral complementarity and intensive interaction, 
making the establishment of (vertically coordinated) agro-industries more difficult.
104
 
Similarly, spatial separation fosters “economic disintegration because movement between the 
zones is strictly regulated by the political, bureaucratic and military apparatus constituted by 
the occupation.”105 
A study by the World Bank found that workers in agriculture on the one hand experience 
difficulties of finding alternative economic activities. On the other hand, various restrictions 
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act as limitations to the intensification of agriculture. These restrictions mainly apply to area 
C, in which most of the West Bank‟s fertile agricultural land is located. However, Palestinian 
access to this land is either prohibited or severely restricted.
106
 Usually, farmers in areas A 
and B, which are under Palestinian, respectively, shared control, do not encounter direct 
problems related to for example raids, violent attacks or demolishment of farm houses and 
equipment.
107
 This land is considered safe.
108
 Farmers in area C however do have to expect 
such actions, as a number of them have received (threats of) demolishment orders or cautions 
that they should abandon their houses.
109
 A cattle farmer in Yatta whose farm is located in 
Area C, is regularly visited by Israeli soldiers, but so far, he did not have any negative 
experiences with them.
110
 Another respondent, whose previous farm was located in area C, 
was less lucky. He said that soldiers took his machines and some farming equipment and kept 
harassing him until he moved to another place.
111
 Land and property insecurity are thus one of 
the major risks associated with farming that are particular to the Israeli occupation. 
Buildings in area C, including the necessary (transportation) infrastructure, require permits 
approved by the Israeli authorities which are difficult to obtain. According to El Hayek, 
building permits are often rejected by the Israeli authorities due to lack of land 
registrations.
112
 However, anything that is built without official permission runs the risk of 
being demolished.
113
 Therefore, although this area is empty, i.e. largely uninhabited and not 
used for agricultural purposes, Palestinians are not keen on using this land. In the outskirts of 
Sa‟ir, several farmers had received demolishment threats or cautions to leave their houses.114 
Hamza, a farmer in Yatta, had to rebuild his farm after it was demolished by Israeli soldiers. 
At the time, the location was situated in Area C. After a few years however, control of the 
area was handed over to the municipality of Yatta, from which Hamza bought some plots and 
rebuilt his farm.
115
 Another farmer‟s herd severely decreased in size because his old house 
was demolished and he had to sell nearly half of his livestock in order to buy a new house in 
another location.
116
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The described experiences by farmers demonstrate the different forms of power applied 
through Israeli occupation policies. Spatial segmentation (sovereign-territorial) and 
management of the population (bio-power) through bureaucratic and military means together 
function to disintegrate and disable the Palestinian economy. These bio-territorial forms of 
power should not be treated as distinct from each other; rather, they perpetuate and reinforce 
each other, making them an even more effective means to efficiently manage the 
occupation.
117
 
Settlements 
Several sheep farmers have plots of land near settlements, which they often cannot use 
because of violent attacks by settlers.
118
 Regularly, settlers burn olive trees, kill sheep grazing 
on these plots or directly attack Palestinians who try to plant or harvest something there.
119
 
Some farmers reported incidents with settlers in Susya and Yatta, where settlers drowned 
several sheep.
120
 Additionally, farmers said that they are prevented from building stables on 
these plots, streets that lead towards them and wells for the collection of rainwater.
121
 Some 
reported that showing their ownership documents is futile in these cases.
122
 One sheep farmer 
has tried complaining about these problems at Israeli courts, but their cases would be 
postponed repeatedly until they would give up. Finally, he sold most of his sheep because of 
settlers harassing him.
123
 One family reported that 15 years ago, before their olive trees had 
been cut down by settlers, Israeli and Palestinian authorities had arranged coordinated 
protection with soldiers for farmers during olive harvest, which takes place at the same time 
in the whole West Bank.
124
 They did, however, not know if such coordination does still take 
place.  
The PCBS provides figures for holdings that were constrained by Israeli measures in Hebron 
governorate in 2010. The constraints include the West Bank barrier, Israeli settlements, 
military barriers and closed Israeli military areas. The figures show that animal holdings have 
the smallest amount of land compared to mixed and plant holdings and therefore face the least 
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amount of the above constraints.
125
  Farm size is thus negatively correlated to constraints by 
Israeli measures. In light of the high value of dairy products (as well as meat), this yet again 
indicates that livestock farming is better suited to the current land use restrictions in the oPt 
than arable farming. 
In many cases plots of land, including those near settlements, have been inherited from one 
generation to the next. The owners cannot sell them because no Palestinian is interested in 
buying them but they also do not have the capital to buy more land nearby their houses; in 
safe areas. Acquiring land is difficult because Palestinian towns and villages are constantly 
expanding, making free plots of land in safe areas rare and very expensive. Because of the 
problems with using land near settlements, people generally prefer to put their animals near 
their houses.
126
  
Abstracting from the concept and meaning of „genocide,‟ Hanafi argues that the 
dispossessions and confiscations of land, the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements and 
segmentation of land in three areas are all part of a larger project which he calls „spacio-cide.‟ 
This colonial project “targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the „voluntary‟ 
transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which the 
Palestinian people live.” What once was considered „territory‟ is, according to Hanafi, 
transformed into mere land. Indeed, travelling through the West Bank, one encounters wide, 
but desolate areas that are indeed „no-peoples‟ land.‟127 The notion is supported by Hanieh, 
who describes conscious Israeli efforts to empty and then colonize land.
128
 Thereby a 
„dehistoricization of place and space‟ takes place where „facts on the ground are cast as 
normality.‟129 This and the loss of resources create a struggle for Palestinians that forces them 
to choose between making a living and fighting for their history. 
3.2 Feed and other imported inputs 
Another risk associated with farming has to do with prices and availability of feed and other 
inputs. Sheep and goats farmers usually feed wheat and straw to their livestock. These farmers 
keep their animals in sheds near or below the house. The shortage of grazing land means that 
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farmers mainly depend on bought feed supplies. Some, however, lead them out on their lands 
for three or four months in spring, when there is green grass or wheat.
130
  
Cow farmers are usually obliged to feed what is called blih to their cattle, a total mixed ration 
(TMR) that contains all the nutrients and minerals dairy cows need.
131
 Blih is produced in 
professional feeding centres in Israel and is based on grains grown there or abroad.
132
 A trader 
in Hebron confirmed this. Feeding blih to cows is made obligatory for farmers by factory 
owners because it causes the milk to have certain desired characteristics (like a high fat 
percentage and quality) that is necessary for processing it.
133
 Straw, wheat and blih are thus all 
imported from Israel, who in turn partly imports it from other countries such as the USA and 
Ukraine.
134
 The feed is generally available on the market, but particularly in the opinion of 
sheep farmers, it is very expensive.
135
  
The price of wheat, which is connected to world market prices, has risen significantly in 
recent years and appears to be driving sheep and goat farmers out of business.
136
 The price of 
wheat fluctuates; one ton costs between 1200 and 2000 Shekel. A farmer in Sa‟ir has to pay 
extra because he pays the feed trader only after he has sold some of the lambs.
137
 Dependence 
on the use of imported feed makes smallholder farmers particularly vulnerable to e.g. 
economic crises. This dependence would be reduced by increased use of indigenous materials 
and domestically grown feed.
138
 
Wheat however appears to be planted in rather small quantities in Palestine. Some of the 
farmers were planting wheat on small plots, but they still had to buy about 80 per cent of the 
required feed in addition.
139
 Alternative feeds like green beans and lentils are grown rarely.
140
 
According to farmers, importing wheat from Israel is cheaper, but many small-scale farmers 
also said they sold more and more of their once large herds because of the rising feed 
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prices.
141
 Planting wheat domestically is generally considered too expensive and difficult 
because cultivation depends on rain, since the supply of water via networks is unreliable and 
weak.
142
 Harvesting wheat is possible just once per year, and often the yields are bad.
143
  
In 2001, 0.4 per cent of the wheat planted in the oPt was irrigated, while 99.6 per cent were 
rain fed. With a yield of about 300 kg per donum, the irrigated area resulted in more than 
twice as much harvest than the rain fed one.
144
 With regard to domestic growth of feed, 
various import restrictions related to occupation policies make the import of required inputs 
like for example chemical fertilizer, potassium and some pesticides very difficult. Allegedly, 
they could be used for building bombs. But their limited availability makes agriculture rather 
difficult and expensive.
145
 Additionally, there are no specialized feeding centres in the oPt that 
could process and mix the grains as required for dairy farming. 
Cow farmers who have to import blih sometimes experience problems with regard to timely 
transportation of the feed which is a daily product that easily spoils.
146
 It keeps well only for 
about 24 hours. Waiting times at checkpoints, curfews, border closures and transportation fees 
add to the cost of this high-quality feed.
147
 A cattle farmer in Idna pays 2000 Shekel for 
transport and 1260 Shekel per ton of feed. He said the price is non-negotiable and he has to 
pay on time, regardless if he would be able to sell all his milk.
148
 Most cow farmers have 
either contracts with feed factories in Israel or they buy it from traders. This feed product‟s 
price also varies, and has been increasing in recent years.
149
 A farmer in Yatta chose to feed 
his cows what he described as a dry version of blih, which is less expensive (1700 shekel per 
ton) but also results in three to four litres less milk yield per cow.
150
 
The feed farmers usually give to their livestock is mostly imported from Israel, which is 
problematic for two reasons. First, the reliance on imported feed supplies reaffirms the 
asymmetric dependency of Palestinian economic sectors (here: agriculture) on the larger 
Israeli economy. Secondly, in recent years price levels for various sorts of feed have risen 
significantly. The prices are impacted by several factors. Droughts causing contractions in 
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international grain supplies, expanding world economies as well as increased food demand in 
developing countries and depreciation of the U.S. dollar have impacted the prices of feed 
grain. Additionally, the expanding production of bioethanol has significantly contributed to 
the price increases of corn and soybeans.
151
 
The field research results demonstrate that one of the most important factors for the 
production of milk is animal feed, prices and availability. Dairy farmers who would like to 
expand their herds in order to become large-scale producers also have to invest in improved 
feeding systems, which are costly.
152
 In addition, the substantial restrictions on the use of 
irrigation water harm Palestinian agriculture, thereby preventing the viable expansion and 
diversification of crops and successful growth of feed.
153
 
Next to feed, there are several other goods and ingredients that need to be imported from other 
countries. Usually all of them have to pass through Israel first. According to an agricultural 
engineer, production costs in Palestine are very high because of this.
154
 Furthermore, factories 
need to import micro ingredients, like the starter, stabilizers, proteins and minerals which 
mainly come from European suppliers like Germany, France, Denmark and Italy.
155
 These 
products are either imported through Israel or bought from Jordanian traders. As with the 
feed, such imports also can result in waiting times for products to be cleared at borders and 
checkpoints. This means that factory managers need to plan and order their required inputs 
well in advance.
156
 
3.3 Water politics 
Water is one of the most important resources needed in farming, but in the oPt it also is a 
politically contested natural resource.
157
 Farmers‟ perceptions about the accessibility of water 
for their land and households differed mainly due to location. Small-scale farmers in the 
outskirts of Sa‟ir said they would not pay for water, because their village council gave it to 
them for free which is possible because there is a spring nearby owned by the council.
158
 In 
village centres and cities, water is delivered by networks managed by municipalities. For 
farms, the main sources of water are shown in table 2. Farms that exclusively keep livestock 
                                                          
151
 Andrew Muhammad and Ellene Kebede, “The Emergence of an Agro-Energy Sector: Is Agriculture Importing 
Instability from the Oil Sector?,” Choices 24, no. 1, Agricultural & Applied Economics Association (2009).  
152
 Devendra, 107-109. 
153
 Naqib, 509. 
154
 Interview Nr. 2. 
155
 Interview Nr. 12, 13, 18. 
156
 Interview Nr. 13. 
157
 Alatout, 611. 
158
 Interview Nr. 5, 7, 8, 10. 
29 
 
use less water because there is no need for irrigation.
159
 Nevertheless, all respondents reported 
problems with the available water quantities and prices. Generally, cost is less of a problem 
for them than obtaining sufficient quantities of water for their farms.
160
 
 
Table 2.
161
  
In Bani Naem, water from the municipality costs 6 NIS per cubic metre, according to a sheep 
farmer. In Hebron, it costs 5 NIS. Network water appears to be fairly inexpensive and farmers 
do not consider it a problem, but the price is still higher than what farmers pay in Israel.
162
 
Getting sufficient water is especially a problem for those farms that are located on hills, 
because the already weak pressure of the water flowing through the pipes causes it to arrive 
on hilltops in rather low quantities.
163
 In such locations, they have water only two days per 
week or sometimes even just once in a fortnight.
164
 Also, farms located further outside towns, 
out of the reach of municipality networks, have difficulties in ensuring a constant supply of 
water because they depend on truck deliveries.
165
 These are much more expensive; also 
because of the transport costs involved. Farmers cope with the weak water supply by saving 
water in cisterns in the ground or in tanks.
166
 Because the water supply from municipalities is 
unreliable especially in summer, many farmers additionally buy tanks of water which often 
are of poor quality.
167
 They cost about 40 Shekel per cubic metre and 150 Shekel per tank.
168
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The networks‟ limited reach is, however, not the only problem. Farmers stated that digging 
wells that are deeper than about 15 metres and reach groundwater is not allowed due to Israeli 
military orders, not even on farmers‟ own land.169 Doing so is considered dangerous because 
Palestinians are forbidden from developing any springs, surface or underground water 
reserves which were not already tapped and in use at the time of occupation in 1967.
170
  
Most of the West Bank‟s aquifer and spring water is located in Area C, where applications for 
new wells and agricultural water projects have to be approved by the Israeli Civil 
Administration and the Joint Water Committee.
171
 The JWC is tasked with the 
implementation of article 40 of the 1995Oslo II interim agreement, which recognized 
Palestinian water rights in the West Bank and delineated their current and future needs for a 
five year interim period.
172
 Due to asymmetries of power, capacity, information and interest, 
the JWC does not function as a „joint‟ water resource management institution.173 Projects 
regularly result in long delays and rejections. Since its establishment, and especially in the 
years after the second Intifada, the number of approved projects has been low and even less 
were implemented, which severely constrains agricultural production in the area.
174
 Thus, this 
„water sharing arrangement‟ “only helps strengthen present, unjust and inequitable territorial 
arrangements.”175 Godlewski even argues that the GoI uses the JWC “to open up a dialogue 
with the PA,” thereby creating a “sense of legitimacy […] whereby the Israelis use the JWC 
to their advantage without granting any real concessions to the Palestinians.
176
 
Restrictions on local water supply and the lack of wells and natural sources of water have 
caused inhabitants of area C to depend increasingly on purchasing water from Israeli 
companies like Mekorot.
177
 This is also the cause of water being more expensive in the 
Hebron area than in some other municipalities of the West Bank which do have a spring at 
their disposal. Costs and shortage of water in the Hebron area make dairy production more 
expensive, thereby limiting the capability of Palestinian milk producers to expand.
178
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Additionally, farmers‟ dependence on Israeli water companies makes them vulnerable to 
arbitrary politically-motivated supply shortages.
179
 
The underlying reasons for limited water availability are mainly political in nature. Water 
scarcity in the oPt may be considered a natural condition of arid and semi-arid regions.
180
 
Whether or not this is true, Israeli policies towards the oPt have built on this assumption and 
„successfully‟ politicized it. The politics surrounding water can be considered another form of 
Bio-territorial power.
181
 Despite contracts between Hebron municipality and Mekorot, water 
supplies to the Hebron area especially in summer are regularly reduced, with natural water 
shortage stated as a reason.
182
 This „reason‟ can be considered implausible in light of 
settlements‟ high water consumption not only for domestic use and ample irrigation, but also 
for swimming pools.
183
 Water scarcity is thus a politically constructed problem and is more 
entrenched in unequal distribution of water than the alleged dearth of geological resources in 
the West Bank.
184
 This is demonstrated by the substantial amount of groundwater sources in 
the West Bank developed by Mekorot, who subsequently sell this water to Palestinians.
185
 
Occupation policies are thus not „only‟ about taking control of vital resources, thereby setting 
a limit to Palestinian development, but also about profit generation for large Israeli 
companies. 
3.4 Occupation and economic autonomy 
The preceding sections discussing arbitrary military and bureaucratic regulations, violent 
attacks on Palestinian property, import dependencies and dispossession of and denied access 
to crucial resources demonstrated in different ways the lack of Palestinian autonomy in 
decisions and policies directly affecting domestic economic development.  
As my analysis showed, this autonomy would include the ability to enforce the gradual 
expansion of ground water sources for Palestinian use in the West Bank as laid down in the 
interim agreement.
186
 Also, it concerns the liberty to introduce protectionist measures in order 
to support the growth of Palestinian (infant) industries by shielding them from heavy 
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competition and the liberty of Palestinian business to choose their own import partners and 
import whatever goods are needed for domestic economic development to gradually lessen 
dependence on Israel. 
Under different circumstances, an increase in economic authority might not necessarily 
require national sovereignty. Under external pressure however, the PA adopted a course that 
seems to foreclose both. In recent years, the PA embraced a neoliberal vision that was 
codified in the Palestine Reform and Development Program (PRDP, 2008-2010). Heavily 
influenced by the World Bank, international financial institutions (IFI), donors and foreign 
governments including Israel, the program was intended to spur economic reforms to reach a 
free market economy open to regional and global markets.
187
  The close entwining of financial 
institutions with those of the PA resulted in IFI to “fully oversee Palestinian economic 
development and policy making.”188 Additionally, “the distribution of donor funding to the 
PA was made contingent on the implementation of the PRDP.”189 This way, the PA‟s 
remaining policy space was reduced even more.  
It is very doubtful that neoliberal premises are in any way suited to the particularities of a 
state under military occupation that lacks economic authority, has no clearly defined 
economic borders, no control over entry points, sea- and airports and whose monetary system 
is tied to decisions of the Israeli central bank.
190
 With the introduction of the PRDP, it will be 
even more difficult for Palestinian business to develop competitiveness against bigger players 
since protectionist measures are out of the question. Instead, the program is likely to 
perpetuate and exacerbate existing political-economic asymmetries and reduce Palestinian 
economic autonomy even further. This is in line with the Oslo Accords, which divided the 
West Bank in three areas, confining 90 per cent of the population who lived in areas B and C 
to a patchwork of isolated enclaves.
191
 The Paris Protocol formalized Israeli control over all 
external borders, hereby curtailing Palestinians‟ ability to develop sustainable trade relations 
with third countries. Additionally, Israel has the final say over what the oPt are allowed to 
import and export.
192
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It appears that with every „agreement‟ or „reform program,‟ the PA traded away more 
autonomy in exchange for the „economic peace‟ advocated by Israel.193 This is not to say that 
Palestinian leadership ever possessed such self-rule, but only with Oslo and the PRDP, they 
officially acquiesced to the system of occupation.
194
 While the leadership‟s weakness is surely 
tied to the dependency position of the oPt, the lack of economic autonomy in turn reproduces 
dependence on external capital and Israeli goodwill to e.g. transfer tax payments. This creates 
a vicious circle whose current outcome seems to be the normalization of occupation structures 
and acceptance of current conditions as permanent.
195
 Hanieh argues that neoliberalism 
reinforces the physical fragmentation of Palestinians by turning them away from collective 
struggle towards individualized consumption and a preference for stability facilitated by 
(debt-based) finance. In the meantime, dispossession and expulsion of Palestinians from their 
land slowly continue.
196
 The question is what this means for the aspirations and willingness of 
the Palestinian leadership to keep pressing for a solution to the conflict that involves the 
establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.  
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4. Micro-level perspectives: The dairy sector in Hebron 
In this chapter, I describe and analyse the field research findings of the case study with regard 
to differences in production and marketing as they relate to the dairy farmers. The interviews 
led me to distinguish roughly between two groups in the milk farming and dairy industry with 
regard to the area of Hebron and surrounding villages. The first group includes sheep and goat 
farmers or small-holders. The second group consists of dairy factories and dairy cow farmers 
with intensive farming systems. Their available resources, objectives, customers or target 
groups, ways of processing milk, marketing strategies, profit, demand for their products and 
ways of dealing with risk vary considerably. I describe and interpret these differing findings 
in relation to the first group in section 4.1 and with regard to the second group in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 discusses the findings in light of politically-motivated trade asymmetries and the 
challenges they pose for sector expansion and economic development. 
4.1 Sheep and goat farms 
From the field research, it emerged that only few livestock holders have started keeping 
animals on their own accord. Rather, it is more common for farmers to inherit the pastoralist 
life from previous generations.
197
 Various farmers‟ families used to have more animals in the 
past, but they sold many of them because of rising feed prices and insufficient (safe) land for 
sheds and grazing.
198
 Due to urban environment, population growth and general land scarcity, 
there are few small-scale farmers in the city of Hebron. In more rural areas like Bani Naem, a 
town with about 20.000 inhabitants, keeping livestock is much more common. There are 
about 500 livestock holders in Bani Naem.
199
 This number includes every animal holder with 
at least five heads of sheep or goats, thus also very small-scale farmers.
200
 In 2013, there were 
6787 animal and mixed holdings in the whole governorate of Hebron. Combined, they had 
185.000 goats and sheep whose main purpose was milk production. About 60 per cent of 
these animals and their products were intended for household consumption, while about 40 
per cent of them were used to generate income.
201
 From these numbers, it can be inferred that 
about one per cent of the governorate‟s population is involved in livestock farming. 
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Composition of livelihoods and management of risks in farming  
The livelihoods of those households whose income depends solely on farming differ 
significantly from those who use it as an additional income source. For farmers who depend 
on livestock as a main income source, it appears that even a large number, e.g. 250 sheep and 
goats is barely sufficient to provide a family with a very basic living standard.
 202
 Still, 
dairying has a positive influence on household nutrition and poverty reduction because of the 
instant benefits of daily milk production and immediate sales to urban markets.
203
 
Small-scale farmers who keep the animals as their main income usually have much larger 
numbers of livestock than „hobby-farmers‟. According to the former group of farmers, they 
did not have any other possibilities to earn a livelihood, mostly because they were not 
educated in other fields and farming was the only profession they had learned; often from 
their fathers and grandfathers. Hence, the main factor constraining their job choices appears to 
be lack of education. In addition, insufficient surplus income constrains their ability to invest 
in any other business or further education.
204
   
The harsh living conditions of these farmers and their statements indicate a lack of coping 
strategies with regard to the various risks they face. The World Development Report 2014 
defines risk as the possibility of loss.
205
 Depending on their exposure, internal conditions and 
risk management, certain groups are more vulnerable to losses from negative shocks.
206
 In 
order to engage in successful risk management, farmers need to be capable of preparing for 
risk and be able to cope with it once a negative shock has occurred.
207
 Preparation consists of 
knowledge acquisition, i.e., getting information and assessing it with regard to risks in order 
to reduce uncertainty. Additionally, obtaining protection to limit the possibility and effects of 
negative shocks is important. Attaining insurance so as to spread costs between good and bad 
periods is another critical aspect of preparation. The goal of risk management is thus to 
increase benefits on the one hand and decrease losses when faced with risk on the other.
208
 
For sheep and goat farmers, animal diseases represent significant risks. This is one of the most 
difficult issues especially small-scale dairy farmers have to deal with.
209
 When a female sheep 
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or goat dies, it represents a big loss for the farmer (income shock). They have not only lost a 
valuable animal, but, of course, they also cannot get lambs and, consequently, milk from it 
anymore. Especially if those ewes get sick or die which were previously selected because of 
strength and high milk production, the farmer incurs a significant loss.
210
 One farmer in the 
outskirts of Bani Naem said that from 250 lambs, about 50 die. This is due to diseases, 
stillbirths, climatic conditions.
211
 Such incidents cause the income of farmers to fluctuate.
212
 
Additionally, farmers have various expenses. Their sheep regularly need a veterinarian and 
sometimes medicine, which small-holders have to pay for themselves. Since the animals are 
usually kept in sheds due to a lack of grazing areas, farmers also have to buy feed. According 
to all respondents, wheat and straw, while widely available, are rather expensive at the 
moment.  
Farmers‟ resilience to income shocks is determined by how well they have been prepared and 
in which ways they are able to cope with them.
213
 Additionally, it influences their ability to 
accumulate surplus capital and invest it in ways that serve the expansion of their farms. The 
interviews show that farmers deal with risks and income shocks differently, although certain 
patterns emerge. Many interviewees explained that they rely on family members for larger 
investments or in times of need. A number of farms, especially those that were not inherited, 
were set up by brothers in order to accumulate sufficient starting capital and to spread the 
risks.
214
 Also, employing family members is cheaper than hiring external workers.
215
 Poorer 
households have the tendency to use costly coping mechanisms, such as selling a productive 
asset like livestock, cutting on food consumption or consuming lower-quality food. 
Households who sell productive assets curtail their (long-term) ability to generate sufficient 
income for the time after the shock.
216
 It appeared that various farmers were forced to sell 
some of their goats and sheep in order to buy feed for the remaining ones because their 
incomes were not sufficient to pay for the running costs.
217
 This means that often the profit of 
selling dairy products is so low that even the most basic expenses cannot be covered. This is 
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also due to the current prices of feed, which represent another point of risk for farmers (see 
3.2).
218
  
Another way of dealing with risk is to set up a cooperative, which was done in the village of 
Bani Naem.
 219
 Such initiatives show that people are aware of the risks involved in farming 
and try to spread them by co-owning herds of livestock. 
Various risks like animal diseases, property insecurity and unforeseen high expenses that 
Palestinian farmers have to deal with are similar to those risks faced by farmers in developing 
countries elsewhere. The interviews however indicated that these risks are perpetuated and 
exacerbated by the occupation. This concerns especially issues of access to land and water as 
well as property security, as explained in chapter three. Field research points to Palestinian 
farmers engaging in risk-averse behaviour because of hazards caused by occupation policies 
such as insecurity over investments, trade difficulties, movement and access restrictions and 
general lack of (political) stability. 
Others who like to keep working in farming despite its risks try to cope with them by having 
additional jobs in other sectors in order to secure a reliable income.
220
 One farmer who owns 
about 60 sheep and goats works as a carpenter and flexibly moves between working for his 
boss and taking care of his animals.
221
 A few of the farmers also trade with goats and sheep in 
order to earn a small profit.
222
 From 2010 to 2013, the number of animal holdings decreased 
by 25 per cent and the number of mixed holdings increased by 17 per cent. This shows that 
some farmers try to spread risks by widening their portfolio.
223
 
Dairy production and herd size 
The season for milking usually lasts between three and five months, between January and 
May.
224
 Most of the small-scale farmers let the animals give birth in winter, because then the 
possibility for lambs getting infected with diseases by insects or die because of the heat is the 
lowest.
225
 Only very few farmers spread births and according lactation periods over the course 
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of the year.
226
 Those who do so have constant milk supply which enables them to produce 
dairy during the whole year, thereby generating a more steady income. 
Most farmers let their herds grow slowly through constant reproduction, a necessity for 
having lactating ewes.
227
 Very few farms use artificial insemination to induce sheep to give 
birth twice a year.
228
 Only those few farmers who engaged in trading buy additional 
animals.
229
 Others have reported not wanting to buy more because of the limited size of their 
stables, lack of money for acquiring and feeding more animals or, in the case of hobby-
farmers, because they have sufficient ewes to cover the dairy needs of the household  and 
because their income does not depend on dairy sales.
230
 While for hobby-farmers there is no 
need to upscale, farmers whose livelihoods solely depend on livestock and milk production 
would possibly benefit from enlarging their herds and stables. Most of these larger-scale 
sheep and goat farms are however family run and have no access to credit or additional land. 
Especially the latter is directly influenced by occupation policies. Under these conditions, the 
limit to herd extension is set by the limited labour available and the carrying capacity of the 
stable and land currently owned by the family. 
Apart from these limiting factors, buying goats and sheep is usually no problem in terms of 
availability; they can be purchased from larger farms, from the market or even in the centre of 
Hebron.
231
 The total number of the herd is determined by several factors. Animals that have 
reached a certain age, get sick or do not give milk (anymore) are sold, usually to the butcher. 
If the household can afford it, more efficient sheep are bought to replace them. Depending on 
how many of the new-born lambs are females, more or less will be added to the herd. Many 
farmers keep different numbers of the most promising females in terms of strength, ability to 
give birth twice a year and milk yield.
232
 Male lambs are usually sold to traders or to the 
butcher. Currently, because of high demand and insufficient supply, the price for meat is 
considered high, tempting some farmers to sell more sheep than necessary; sometimes also 
female ones.
233
 This shows that in certain circumstances, farmers prefer „instant cash‟ above 
profit earned in the long-term. This is especially the case if they need a larger amount of 
money at once, for example to pay for a daughter‟s wedding. Also prices of feed determine 
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how much money can be spent on additional animals.
234
 Furthermore, some farmers regularly 
slaughter a sheep for religious holidays or weddings, preventing herds from growing as 
well.
235
  
With the exception of one larger farm whose owner had other income sources as well, none of 
the sheep and goat farmers has a milking machine. With a price of about 10000 Dollar, such 
equipment only pays off if one has a greater number of animals.
236
 In 2013 there were 571 
milking machines owned and used in animal and mixed holdings in the Hebron 
governorate.
237
 It can be assumed that they were mainly used for dairy cattle, since even those 
farmers who had between one hundred and two hundred sheep and goats did not own a 
milking machine but milked them by hand. Hesitating to invest in a machine may also be 
related to the fact that it would only be used for a few months per year, during milk season.
238
 
Difficult access to credit as well as uncertainty about one‟s property and equipment because 
of settlers‟ vandalism or Israeli soldiers‟ attacks are likely to influence farmers‟ decisions 
about high-cost investments. 
Marketing of dairy products 
None of the sheep farmers had contracts with dairy companies because they do not work with 
sheep or goat milk. The farmers often sell their milk products to customers directly because 
they only have a few kilos of produce to sell. Selling products to customers directly results in 
a better price and thus more profit for the farmers than if they sell it to shops, which have to 
resell it.
239
 The milk itself is not sold, partly because it does not keep well for long and small-
scale farmers do not have cooling systems or refrigerator trucks to transport it. Although the 
Ministry of Agriculture considers having less than thirty sheep or goats to be for household 
use only, this number often still results in surplus dairy. Small-scale farms usually sell this to 
neighbours, friends and relatives, because they know them and their products, and trust in 
their high quality. Generally there appears to be a high demand for home-made dairy 
products. None of the small-holders with up to thirty animals had any difficulties in selling 
their products and they are usually rather satisfied with the prices they receive for the dairy.
240
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This shows that in small-scale farming, economic structures are well-organized with regard to 
supply and demand on the village level. 
The seasonal nature of home-made dairy produce is somewhat problematic.
241
 All farmers try 
to sell their products in spring, which causes oversupply.
242
 At the beginning of the season, 
the prices are still good. But in the remaining spring months, prices decline; cheese, for 
example, is initially sold for about 30 shekel and can later drop to about 17 shekel.
243
 Farmers 
who have larger amounts of produce sell it to small shops and mini-supermarkets in their own 
and adjoining villages. Such dairy sales are usually based on informal unplanned 
arrangements without contracts. One interviewee whose livelihood depends solely on 
livestock farming said that, especially in spring, he sometimes desperately drives around to 
find buyers. Also, not all customers pay the full amount directly which is detrimental for 
resource-poor farmers.
 244
 Although most farmers can sell their dairy products for 
satisfactorily high prices at the moment because there is a high demand for them, their input 
costs do usually not allow them to gain much or any profit. Therefore, scaling up their 
operations by buying additional land, animals, stables or machinery is often not feasible, but 
also not necessarily desired.  
It has been suggested that contract farming (CF) is a beneficial instrument for both small- and 
large-scale farmers in developing countries.
245
 International development agencies like IFAD 
and the World Bank consider it important to link small-scale farmers to domestic and possibly 
foreign markets, thereby reducing poverty.
246
 Bijman argues that small-scale farmers in 
developing countries often face at least three constraints to increasing productivity and 
income. Often, they lack information about (improved) production methods and market 
opportunities and they do not have the financial reserves for profitable investments. In 
addition, small farmers who operate near subsistence are more risk averse than larger farmers. 
If sufficient consideration is given to the particular operating conditions of Palestinian 
farmers, CF has the potential to (partially) alleviate these constraints.
247
  
Contracting between producers and factories or supermarkets is an efficient way to strengthen 
vertical coordination, i.e. the alignment between activities at different stages of the 
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agricultural food supply chain.
248
CF is particularly well suited for the production and 
marketing of dairy products due to their high value and high perishability.
249
 Contract farming 
reduces transaction costs by decreasing uncertainty, which is directly related to incomplete or 
asymmetric information on current and future conditions. By providing incentive and means, 
CF increases the possibility for investments in farm equipment to improve production 
conditions with regard to efficiency, hygiene, animal welfare, disease reduction and risk 
aversion.
250
 
Small-holders with large herds are likely to benefit from contractual arrangements. Possible 
contractors for them would especially include mini-supermarkets, who could buy the home-
made dairy products from farmers. Currently, Palestinian dairy factories are not yet able to 
process sheep milk because of its different characteristics than cow milk and because of the 
seasonality of production by sheep farmers, making regular, reliable supply difficult. 
Additionally, there are too few collection centres and the production conditions at farm level 
are deficient with regard to hygiene and efficiency.
251
 Once these obstacles are overcome, 
contracts with milk processing firms could induce farmers to make the necessary investments, 
e.g. buy cooling tanks and trucks.
252
 Thereby, risks can be transformed from a burden to an 
incentive to undertake change and pursue opportunities.
253
 
4.2 Dairy cow farms and factories 
In this section, I describe findings from the case study with regard to cow farms and factories, 
paying special attention to issues that distinguish them from sheep farms. In 2012 there were 
eleven manufacturers of dairy products in the Hebron governorate.
254
 I visited one very large 
and two smaller factories and four cow farms. The factories have differing numbers of 
employees; Al Jabrini, the largest, has 400, while Al Safy employs about forty and Al Natsha 
just ten workers.
255
 The cow farms are in located in Yatta, Idna and Al Arroub and can be 
considered intensive farming systems.
256
 In 2013, there were 4077 heads of cattle for milk 
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production in the Hebron governorate. Together with Jenin, this is the highest number for 
cattle in a West Bank governorate.
257
 
Milk production on cattle farms in Hebron 
Three of the farmers have established their farms including cows, stables and machinery by 
working together with their brothers.
258
 The smaller factories, Al Natsha and Al Safy, also 
were built through family cooperation.
259
 This way sufficient capital could be collected in 
order to pay for initial expenses. The farms are not older than five to fifteen years.
260
 Keeping 
dairy cattle is still a fairly new phenomenon in the Hebron area.
261
 All of the farms and 
factories are family businesses and have been established step by step.
262
 Al Natsha and Al 
Safy even started by making dairy products manually, but have then switched to machines.
263
 
The farmers started with small numbers of cows first, but quickly earned enough in order to 
buy more cattle. These findings indicate that during the 1990‟s, some families managed to 
establish factories despite the difficult situation during the first Intifada (Palestinian uprising). 
Usually, cattle farmers do not have jobs other than their farms. The livelihood they earn from 
selling the milk is sufficient to cover the needs of the family.
264
 Also, sometimes there is 
money left to expand the farm by building more stables or buying additional cows.
265
 This 
shows that dairy cow farms generally have better growth opportunities than sheep farms, 
possibly because the former have a higher profit margin than the latter and because dairy 
factories only work with cow milk.
266
 In contrast to sheep farms, cow farms produce milk all 
year round. All cow farms use milking machines and a cooling tank to store the milk in until it 
is collected by the factory drivers.
267
 This way, they can provide factories with a reliable, 
constant supply of high-quality milk, making them more interesting contract partners. These 
practices demonstrate that cattle farms are much more professionalized than sheep farms and 
therefore better suited for vertical coordination with milk factories. 
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Currently, Palestinian farmers can only buy cows from Israel because occupation policies and 
the lack of Palestinian sea- and airports preclude direct import of livestock.
 268
 According to 
different respondents, sometimes there are significant health problems with these cows. A 
representative from the Agricultural Ministry said that the dependence on Israeli cows causes 
some traders to illegally import livestock into the West Bank, thereby avoiding health checks. 
The cows, some of which are infected, are then sold cheaply to farmers who do not always 
recognize diseases immediately and thereby risk the spread of diseases on Palestinian 
farms.
269
 This way, farms in Idna and Yatta lost several cows to smallpox. Additionally, the 
spread of such diseases means that there are fewer imports of cows, driving up their prices.
270
 
In order to expand their herds and decrease dependence on imported (sometimes low-quality 
or sick) Israeli cows, well-informed breeding presents an opportunity to lower costs in the 
long run. This might, however, require some initial investments like larger stables. The 
farmers in the Hebron area did not engage in breeding because they consider rearing young 
cows as too expensive and they did not have sufficient space for them. Therefore, new-born 
calves were sold after a few days or weeks.
271
 Sometimes, farmers depended on selling calves 
earlier than necessary in order to have ready money. These practices show that herds of dairy 
cattle usually stay about the same size once they are large enough to generate sufficient 
income to cover all farm and household expenses. Nevertheless, all farmers expressed the 
desire to expand and develop their farms further and to engage in breeding in order to 
improve certain characteristics of their cattle, but either they have to find affordable, suitable 
plots of land first or wait for cattle prices to get lower.
272
 Especially the former is difficult to 
achieve in light of artificial land shortages caused by occupation policies (see 3.1). 
Additionally, the expenses for feed, veterinary controls of pregnant cows, tanks of water and 
paying taxes make it difficult for farmers to accumulate sufficient capital for expansion.  
The Ministry of Agriculture or other government agencies do currently not engage in 
agricultural extension services such as trainings for farmers. The only support they offer for 
cow farmers is occasional help with rebuilding a roof after heavy storms and vaccinations 
against common livestock diseases carried out by their vet.
273
 The limited budget of the PA 
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prevents the MoA from supporting farmers while recognizing their importance to Palestinian 
food security, development and employment generation.
274
 
Marketing of dairy products 
Organized marketing and market outlets are important prerequisites for the distribution and 
sale of milk.
275
 This is the biggest direct problem encountered by owners of dairy cattle. 
Usually these farmers do not process the milk in any way, but sell it directly either to a trader 
or to dairy companies such as Al Juneidi, Al Jabrini and Al Safy.
276
 Cattle farmers are less 
likely to sell their milk to the same kind of mini-markets as sheep farmers do, except if there 
are temporarily no other buyers. Instead, they sell their milk to buyers with more capital-
intensive processing plants like dairy factories because the farmers are able to provide them 
with a steady and reliable flow of raw material which the factories need to maintain a high 
capacity utilization rate.
277
 Although they have (long-term) contracts in which certain 
amounts of milk are agreed upon to sell, the farmers cannot always rely on these contracts.  
A more political problem is the following. Gaza represents a big market regarding dairy sales 
for especially Al Juneidi. Due to surges of violence between Gaza and Israel and arbitrary 
closures of the border, this market is rather unstable. Thus, whenever for example Al Juneidi 
is unable to transport its products into the Gaza Strip, it takes much smaller amounts of milk 
from their suppliers, leaving them with no choice but to sell their surplus milk for dumping 
prices to other factories, neighbours and village people.
278
 Cow farmers can thus deal with the 
risk, but in a very inefficient manner and at a loss. This is especially harsh for the farmers 
because they have to keep feeding their cows and contracts with Israeli feeding centres force 
them to not only buy the agreed quantities of cattle feed, but also to pay them directly without 
deferment.
279
 A farmer in Idna experienced this situation during the last war in Gaza in 2014. 
Whenever he could not sell his milk, he would have to throw it away after two days, facing a 
huge loss.
280
 This in turn is likely to disrupt relations with the factory that reneges on their 
contract. Additionally, factories might not always take the agreed amount of milk because of 
fluctuating demand for dairy products. One farmer said that Al Juneidi, a large dairy factory 
in Hebron, gets milk samples from all the farmers at the beginning of every year, chooses the 
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highest quality milk and selects these farms to have contracts with.
281
 Such short-term 
contracts generate a lot of uncertainty for farmers. These risks involved in being able or not to 
sell all their milk makes it difficult for farmers to for example think of expanding their herds. 
Also, some farmers were of the opinion that factories are trying to reduce dependence on 
other farms by establishing or extending their own estate farms, thereby reducing external 
demand for milk.
282
 The risks connected to marketing the milk in an unstable region cause the 
dairy sector to only grow rather slowly, despite rising demand. 
Contention with the prices received for milk appeared to differ per town. According to some 
respondents, dairy factories in Hebron together determine the price of milk in relation to 
market demand but also in order to secure certain profits for themselves.
283
 Another farmer 
experienced it as a problem that he gets paid by the factories by cheque and would therefore 
receive his money only after three or four months. He found this difficult because of the 
running expenses that often have to be paid for directly.
284
 
The empirical findings indicate that farmers‟ relationships with contractors often are uneven 
regarding power. Contractors sometimes renege from the agreements without consequences or 
exercise power in imposing the terms of the contract.
285
 Further, farmers would benefit from 
more specific adaptation of the terms of contracts to the Palestinian context, especially with 
regard to demand shocks, closures of Gaza or road blockades within the West Bank that 
restrict the transportation of raw milk, dairy products or feed. Including likely contingencies 
in contracts would better protect farmers from the worst effects of periods where marketing 
milk is difficult. 
A promising aspect of contract farming is to include technical assistance in the stipulations.
286
 
Contractors offering training to farmers in order to improve milk quality, hygiene and 
efficiency can result in higher product prices and enhanced farm production. The provision of 
inputs and assistance reduces transaction and coordination costs for the contractor.
287
 
Currently, only a few factories offer extension services to their supplying farmers.
288
 CF can 
further result in more investments in human and physical capital at the farm level, because 
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owners of capital-intensive production plants have more resources at their disposal and could 
therefore provide farmers with access to credit.
289
 
Dairy factories appear to face a number of problems as well. The larger factories are currently 
producing, on average, at 45 per cent of their production capacity, while constantly working 
to increase the variety of products they offer. Depending on marketing possibilities and the 
availability of input, factories could thus easily expand output. Dairy factories in Hebron at 
the moment are not yet able to produce UHT milk, although such production would be highly 
beneficial to all domestic stakeholders in the dairy business. A manager of a milk-processing 
facility expressed the aspiration to start producing UHT milk, but said that high investment 
costs in machinery, technical maintenance and packaging materials make it a costly 
undertaking.
290
 Nevertheless, such investment would pay off in the long run by enabling 
factories to accept agreed amounts of milk from farmers even if there are negative demand 
shocks. Surplus milk could be processed to UHT milk, which can be stored at room 
temperature for several months. Due to the same reason, factories could start exporting milk 
abroad which is currently impossible due to waiting times at border crossings (checkpoints) 
and (heightened) costs of refrigerator trucks. Longer closures can even lead to the permanent 
loss of perishable goods like milk.
291
 
Under the given circumstances, horizontal expansion of dairy farms and factories is less likely 
than vertical expansion, i.e. intensification.
292
 The latter is supported by the growing 
purchasing power of the domestic market and the great potential in dairy production because 
of its high-value products and less dependence on difficult-to import inputs. Horizontal 
expansion is seriously constrained by land and water availability and the deference of a 
solution to these issues to final status negotiations.
293
  
4.3 Politically-motivated trade asymmetries: challenges for sector 
expansion and economic development 
One of the greater challenges for dairy factories is the competition with Israeli dairy products 
that are imported to the oPt. At the moment, Israeli products have a market share between 30 
and 50 per cent in the oPt.
294
 Palestinian consumers keep buying Israeli products because they 
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consider them to be of higher quality.
295
 Additionally, imported dairy products can be sold at 
a lower price because of the substantial subsidies Israeli producers receive from their 
government and because they have economies of scale. Support for Palestinian agriculture on 
the contrary has been minimal, sporadic, and mainly from nongovernmental organizations.
296
 
This asymmetric competitiveness is based in the PA‟s minimal (economic) policy space. This 
partly results from the current neoliberal policies that prevent the Palestinian leadership from 
taking the necessary steps to support the oPt‟s private sectors (specifically agriculture) and 
shield them from uneven competition.
297
 The PA can for example not independently reduce 
tariff rates or value added taxes.
298
 Due to the PA‟s weak position, decisions on import 
reductions are difficult as well.  
According to the Economic Protocol, there is to be free movement of agricultural goods 
between the Palestinian territories and Israel without additional customs and import taxes.
299
 
Statements from dairy factory managers however showed that this equality does currently not 
exist. The variety of non-tariff restrictions to trade make it virtually impossible even for large 
businesses to export products to Israel, and only very few are able to transport goods to 
Gaza.
300
 The factory managers were rather discontented about them not being allowed to 
export, while Israeli companies in turn can export to the West Bank freely, even without 
compliance with Palestinian health standards and regulations.
301
 The managers considered this 
as very unfair competition. Factory managers and farmers thought that the Palestinian farming 
sector only has a chance to grow when the occupation is ended and trading restrictions are 
lifted.
302
 
Most of the constraints imposed by the Israeli occupation are not officially declared as such; 
instead, they are manifested in a range of informal or casual arrangements that seem 
disconnected and partly apolitical, but when taking a closer look, function as obstacles that set 
an upper limit to economic development of the oPt. Thereby, the asymmetric dependency 
status of the oPt economy is perpetuated and the occupation „managed.‟ It may be inferred 
that due to their „civil‟ nature (as opposed to violent), these measures and arrangements are 
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unlikely to be criticized by international law or human rights institutions and therefore are 
ideally suited to preserve the status quo. The arrangements („casual constraints‟) include the 
pressure exercised on the PA to adopt neoliberal policies that are, in practice, only beneficial 
for Israeli business. Further, they are made up of unrealistic health regulations, standards and 
import requirements that are not communicated clearly towards Palestinian producers.
303
 
Overly bureaucratic permit procedures are another arrangement to obstruct development. 
Khalidi argues that areas under PA control are circumscribed by the structural realities of 
occupation; obtaining Israeli approval for projects for example regularly causes delays.
304
 
Further, movement and access restrictions justified by security concerns, and, most 
importantly, the constant circumvention and questionable interpretation of previous 
agreements and international law by the GoI contribute to the inability of the oPt to build a 
sustainable Palestinian economy.
305
 
These „casual constraints‟ form an integral part of the management of the occupation by 
undermining the possibility to establish a Palestinian market with the capacity to meet the 
needs of its domestic population. At the same time, economic rights, understood as the rights 
of individual Palestinians to subsistence and to earn a livelihood, are denied. 
One of the results of these „casual constraints‟ according to Hanieh was the deliberate 
destruction of the agricultural sector that preceded Israeli domination of Palestinian markets 
for food and manufactured products. This provided Israel with a captive consumer base, 
resulting in Israeli economic expansion.
306
 Additionally, the success of the Israeli dairy 
industry is bolstered by Israel‟s systematic government policies, leading to a suppression of 
local Palestinian farmers‟ initiatives in the oPt. 
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5. Conclusion 
Findings 
In the following, I discuss and summarize my results with regard to the research question.  
My analysis suggests that constraints encountered by participants of the dairy business in 
Hebron largely outweigh their opportunities for expansion. The major constraints are clearly 
constituted by consequences of the Israeli occupation. Further constraints are related to 
internal operations of the sector, such as the insufficient degree of vertical coordination 
between actors. 
The findings indicate that trade and economic development in the oPt remain under political 
and security considerations, which reinforce the dependency of the oPt on Israel and thereby 
perpetrate the status quo of the occupation.
307
  
My analysis showed that many difficulties experienced by Palestinian farmers and producers 
are „casual constraints‟ such as non-tariff barriers and movement and access restrictions that 
add to high volatility and unpredictability in production and trade and lead to reduced 
investments in new activities and technologies. The function of these constraints is to manage, 
but not to resolve the conflict.
308
 Additionally, they perpetrate and often exacerbate existing 
economic asymmetries and economic dependence. Additionally, Israel‟s arbitrary 
interpretation of agreements such as the Paris Protocol constrains Palestinian producers‟ 
possibilities for expansion and creating a ceiling on development.
309
 
Furthermore, economic development in the oPt is obstructed by a virtual non-existence of 
economic autonomy. Especially after the PA‟s adoption of a neoliberal course, their policy 
space to decide on measures that would support domestic private sectors and possibly put 
Israeli importers at a disadvantage had decreased considerably. The absence of autonomous 
economic power forecloses Palestinian ability to challenge asymmetric containment.
310
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In this regard, the  
“international community has generally favoured neoliberal economic policy 
principles and generous funding of a political-economic relation between the 
Palestinian Authority and Israel that does not challenge prolonged occupation, address 
its deep impact, or enable Palestinian economic self-determination.”311  
Instead, the absence of economic autonomy leads to normalization and acceptance of the 
status quo as permanent. These findings indicate that success of the Palestinian political 
economy and the struggle for national liberation and sovereignty are inherently 
interdependent.
312
 
In order to realize the new development approach discussed in the introduction, a lot needs to 
be done. Most importantly, academic analysis based on foundational research and more deep-
reaching investigation of the various Palestinian sub-sectors and their possibilities and 
constraints to seizing the opportunities that they do have can play a key role in achieving the 
rethinking proposed in this thesis. More analysis is needed of the undesirable effects 
generated by the asymmetrically large amount of economic power given to Israel in the 
Protocol.
313
 Focus needs to shift away from a nominal bilateralism that actually masks a 
unilateralism driven by the prerequisites of occupation.
314
 
Moreover, there are various areas with regard to dairying that merit further research. In order 
to understand their influence on the dynamics of the system, investigation of socio-economic 
and policy factors is needed, most usefully done with interdisciplinary approaches.
315
 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations with regard to my thesis. Due to time and resource constraints, the 
number of interviews with farmers and dairy producers I was able to carry out was rather 
small. Therefore, the results of the case study can only serve as indications and are, by 
themselves, not suitable to draw far-reaching conclusions from. Also, snowball sampling used 
as the main research methodology may result in selection bias. Further, it may be argued that 
this thesis is biased because of its emphasis on the Palestinian perspective. 
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Recommendations 
This study‟s findings may be employed for a few recommendations. They are especially 
relevant for development and aid-organizations and address the need to decrease 
(asymmetrical) dependency on imports while boosting domestic production of dairy products 
to diminish the current supply and demand gap. A long-term strategy based on training and 
extension services aimed at sustainable results should be the foremost priority. The impact of 
land use restrictions and water shortages could be reduced by a shift towards dairy cattle 
farms with intermediate or large-scale intensive systems, which exhibit relatively high profits, 
proficiency and better vertical coordination with processing facilities than sheep farms. This is 
also indicated by PCBS figures reporting a strong rising trend in milk production and possible 
shift in consumer preference towards cow dairy between the year 2000 and 2007.
316
  
Domestically grown feed is needed, too, but may be unfeasible under current resource 
constraints. Regarding implementation of such policies, it is likely that certain notions of self-
sufficiency, economic sovereignty and protectionism suggested in this paper cause donors and 
aid agencies as well as the PA to profess little enthusiasm for this new approach, given their 
current focus on neoliberal development thinking.
317
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Annex 1 
Interview guide for farmers 
1. What is your name and age? What is your marital status? 
2. How many members does your household have (all the people living in the house)? 
3. In which year did you (or your parents) start the farm? 
4. Who of your family members is involved in the farm work? Do you have employees? 
5. How many donums of land do you have? Did you buy more land in the last 5 years? 
What is on the land you own? Like olives, vegetables, or food for the 
sheep/goats/cows? If you grow feed, what kind of feed? For how many months of 
feeding is it sufficient? Do you sell it to other farmers? What is the percentage of the 
sheep feed you grow, and of that which you buy? Where do you buy the feed from? 
What kind of feed is it? How much does it cost per ton/kilo? Access difficulties? Price 
changes in recent years for land and feed? 
6. Does your farm produce any other kind of goods besides dairy? Which? Sold or for 
family consumption only? 
7. How many sheep/goats/cows do you have? Female or male sheep? 
8. How many litres of milk does your farm produce per month? How many months per 
year do you have milk? Do your sheep give birth one time per year, or two times? 
(lactation periods) Have you tried to increase the litres of milk that you get from the 
sheep, by breeding, maybe? (explain breeding) 
9. What do you do with the milk, do you sell it directly or do you process it first to 
cheese etc.? Which products do you make from the milk? Who is making the cheese 
etc.? Where do you sell the milk to? To your neighbours, or the market? 
10. Do you or your family contribute in any other form to the family income than by 
working on the farm? Do you have any other job? (Paid labour on other farms, jobs in 
the city etc.) Is the farm profitable enough to support your family? 
11. Would you like to buy more animals? If so, how many/which ones? If you buy more 
sheep, do you thus increase the herd size? Or do you sell/lose about the same amount 
of animals?  
12. Do your animals reproduce? How many lambs do you get per year? How many of 
them do you keep? Do you sell female or male sheep? How many sheep usually stay, 
per year, of the new ones? At which point are the lambs sold? 
13. The wool from the sheep, do you do anything with it, sell it e.g.? 
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14. Would you like to buy more land in the future? How much? Where? If not, why not? 
Do you think it will be easy? Or difficult? (Institutional/informal/economic obstacles) 
Would you consider taking a loan for it? What would you do with additional land? 
Could you buy land from another farmer, who goes out of business? 
15. Have you ever considered building a new stable maybe, somewhere on your land e.g.? 
16. Your land, is it somewhere near the settlements? Do you experience any problems 
regarding settlements, occupation, attacks etc? How do you deal with such risks? 
17. Do you have machinery, like a milking machine, one for making butter or yoghurt 
etc.? Do you want to buy any machinery in the future? Which? Obstacles? 
18. Where does the water come from that you give to the animals? Do you have a well on 
your land? Is there a constant supply of water or are there shortages sometimes? How 
do you deal with shortages? Do you have a tank to store the water? How much is the 
water from the municipality per m3? Price changes in recent years? 
19. How about medicine and doctor for the animals? Do you have a vet, who comes 
sometimes to look after the animals? In which cases does the vet from the government 
come? Do you have to pay for that, when they come by themselves? 
20. Is it easy to sell the products, the cheese and laban etc.? Where/ to whom do you sell 
them? Do you have a constant demand for your products? Is it difficult or easy to find 
buyers for your milk? Do you have a (long-term) contract with a dairy company? How 
satisfied are you with the price you receive for the products?  
21. Do you get any support from the Hebron municipality, the governorate or the state? Or 
from NGOs? 
22. Do you sometimes get help from other farmers, e.g. when the sheep give birth or so? 
(Farm help in busy periods, financial support, social support...) 
23. What do you think about the importance of farming for the economy of Palestine? Is it 
good for the development of the region? 
24. In your opinion, is the farming sector growing or decreasing in Palestine/Hebron? 
25. Do you have any idea how to encourage young people to work in the farming sector? 
What about those young people, who inherit it from their parents/grandparents, do 
they stay in the business? 
26. How does your experience of being a farmer differ from that of your 
father/grandfather? 
27. What would you say is the main difficulty in farming for you? 
28. What is the most satisfying aspect of working with the sheep, what do you like most? 
60 
 
29. Are there any other items you consider important for me to learn about that I have not 
mentioned? 
30. Recommendations to whom I should talk? 
 
Interview guide for factory owners 
1. When did you or the previous owner/father start this factory? 
2. What obstacles did you encounter in building this factory? – license, land, building 
permission etc. 
3. How many people work in your factory? 
4. Do you have your own stables? How many? Where in the West Bank? How many 
cows? Only cows or also goats or sheep? Why/ why not? 
5. How many litres of milk does your farm produce? (What is the monthly average 
amount of milk (l) per animal sort that your farm produces?) 
6. Do you import any feed, milk products or ingredients you use in your products from 
abroad/Israel/Jordan? 
7. How easy or difficult is it for you to have a steady flow of all the inputs you need for 
your production line? 
8. How satisfied are you with the input prices? Have they changed during the last 5 
years? 
9. Would you say that your factory has increased during the last two years in size, 
production output, labour force, profit…? 
10. To whom/where do you sell your products? Do you also export abroad? 
11. What are your plans for the future with this company? Would you like to increase its 
size/hire more labour/buy more cows/ have more stables? 
12. Do you expect any obstacles for this? Which ones? 
13. Do you think there will be more factories like this one in the future? 
14. Do you get support from the government in any way? Building license, money… 
15. What is your general opinion on farming in Palestine? Is there potential for growth? 
For which kind of farmers? 
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Interview questions for water department of Hebron municipality 
1. What is the price of water per m3 in Hebron (city) 
 if delivered by network 
 different price for farmers 
 if delivered by tank 
 different price for farmers 
2. People who are not connected to the network, can they choose how often to get a tank? 
3. Is there a maximum amount of water they get per month?  
4. Have the prices for water changed during the last 5 years? 
5. Is the water price the same for the whole governorate of Hebron? How do prices differ 
from other parts of the West Bank? If differ, reasons? 
6. Which area does the network cover? Is it in all municipalities/villages of the Hebron 
governorate?  
7. Is the municipality or governorate working on extending the network at the moment? To 
which areas? 
8. Regarding water (distribution), do you work together with NGO‟s/UN/US Aid? 
9. Where do you get the water from? Springs? Israel? 
10. Do you have shortages of water sometimes? When? What are the reasons? 
11. Do you work on reducing those shortages? How? 
 
Interview questions for office representative Ministry of Agriculture 
1. How do you define farmers? 
2. How many sheep, goats and cows are there in the Hebron governorate? 
3. Which support and/or extension services do you offer to farmers? 
4. Which animal diseases occur in the Palestinian territories and against which are animals 
vaccinated? 
5. Do farmers have to pay for vaccinations? 
6. When did you start using ear clips for animals and for which reasons? 
7. Aside from diseases, are there any other (health) issues affecting animals? 
 
